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NEW DEAL LABOR POLICY AND THE AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY. By Stanley Vittoz. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press. 1987. Pp. ix, 241. $24.95.
Historians have long hypothesized about the "true" forces behind
New Deal labor legislation. Early historians viewed the New Deal as
a triumph of labor over corporate interests. Others have more recently emphasized the conservative, system-saving features of New
Deal labor legislation, and have argued that it was the result of the
machinations of capitalists and their political allies. 1
In New Deal Labor Policy and the American Industrial Economy,
Professor Stanley Vittoz2 reminds us that the real world is rarely this
well defined. Vittoz agrees with revisionist historians that New Deal
labor policy kept the basic structures of a capitalist system intact; his
disagreement with their work arises "at the level of historical causation" (p. 8). Vittoz argues that
the origins and eventual institutionalization of New Deal labor policy
had very little to do with the manipulative ingenuity of an ideologically
sophisticated corporatist element of the American business elite. On the
contrary, I think it is almost impossible not to consider the labor reform
of the Roosevelt years ... as the largely spontaneous product of a plurality of contending interests whose ideal aims and practical expectations
were freely represented in all the great political contests of the Depression era. [p. 8]

This book is Vittoz's attempt to prove that assertion. To do so, Vittoz
embarks on a "systematic" review of the motivations of industrialists
in certain industries during the New Deal era. From this review he
hopes to support the conclusion that "the response of industrial employers to the intense coupling of politics and economics during the
Roosevelt era ... was not what one would expect to find on the basis
of (exclusively) either the old progressive/pluralist or the newer revisionist interpretations of New Deal reform" (p. 11). Sadly, Vittoz
seems to have forgotten his thesis as he wrote the book.
In part 1 of his three-part book, Vittoz details the market conditions of three industries, analyzing the effect of those conditions on
industrialists' political goals. Vittoz concludes that in each of these
industries, many companies viewed unionization as a tool which could
solve the competitive disequilibria of their particular industry. ·
1. See, e.g., T. ROSENOF, DOGMA, DEPRESSION, AND THE NEW DEAL 16 (1975). Vittoz
describes these two camps of thought, namely, those who view the New Deal legislation as distinctly prolabor and those who view it as probusiness, as "progressive/pluralist" and "revisionist," respectively. P. 11.
2. Visiting Assistant Professor of History at York University. Apparently, this is Vittoz's
first published book.
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Vittoz first analyzes the cotton textile industry. This industry was
dominated in the 1920s and 1930s by chronic overproduction and cutthroat competition. Vittoz argues that these problems arose from a
systemic dislocation in the competitive structure between northern
and southern textile mills; the southern mills had a persistent wage
cost advantage due to lower entry barriers, weaker union strength, and
fewer skilled-worker positions. Vittoz argues that mills throughout
the country were forced to increase production and drive down wages
in a desperate, and ultimately self-defeating, attempt to generate sufficient returns from their capital. In Vittoz's opinion, union weakness
in the textile industry "could only contribute to the perpetuation of an
overall structure of competitive uncertainty that threatened the economic survival of the textile producers" (p. 28). He concludes that the
industry looked to the New Deal as "both an inspiration and an opportunity" to correct the "manifold dysfunctional aspects of [its] entire labor-production-price nexus" (p. 33).
Chapter 2 provides a similar analysis of the garment manufacturing industry. In this industry, low capital costs, rapid design changes,
and wage-sensitive cost structures led to the prevalence of small shops
and low wages - the prototypical "sweatshops." Although early
unionization efforts were vigorously opposed, many employers began
to see that unionization provided the path to industrial rationalization.
Indeed, in the pre-World War I era a "Protocol of Peace" was signed
between the unions and several major employers, in which wages and
work conditions were subject to minimum requirements and in which
both the unions and the employers agreed to support unionization efforts. The economic decline following the war finally broke the Protocol, but its ideals were incorporated into the garment industry codes
promulgated under the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) (p.
99).
The last industry Vittoz analyzes is the bituminous coal mining
industry. Although the coal fields had a strong union presence in the
early 1920s, companies began to feel pressure to switch to nonunion
labor with the advent of reduced foreign demand, increased productivity, and growth in the use of alternative supplies. As with the first two
industries analyzed, "the fate of the individual producer . . . hinged
principally on the economic and strategic determinants of the wage
bill" (p. 53). As these forces led to downward spirals in both wages
and prices, several companies questioned whether unions might not be
best for the industry. 3 While some hoped that the creation of regional
."marketing cartels" would solve the industry's problems, others be3. In a letter circulated among other mine operators in June 1931, one company president
wrote that "the time has come when operators will have to seriously consider whether it is better
to operate with a well-regulated Union which has a legitimate right to exist." P. 64 (quoting a
letter from Frank E. Taplin, president of North American Coal Corporation).
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lieved that the solution lay in a national approach which included
unionization. Vittoz concludes that "major producer coalitions in the
. . . industry struggled to attain economically divergent ends by the
manipulation of new political opportunities attendant upon Congress's
adoption of the [NIRA] early in the summer of 1933" (p. 69).
In part 2 of the book, Vittoz describes the forces leading to the
passage of the NIRA and the effect it had upon the competitive business entities. Chapter 4 describes several "currents of thought" which
"eventually combined to mold the defining features of the . . .
[NIRA]" (p. 78), emphasizing particularly the purchasing power thesis.4 This chapter is disappointing for two reasons: First, Vittoz's
analysis of the passage of the NIRA provides little that is different
from existing descriptions. 5 Second, and more important, Vittoz fails
to provide specific examples of lobbying efforts by representatives of
any of the three industries analyzed in part 1. The reader must be
satisfied with broad generalizations. 6
Perhaps Vittoz saves this chapter at its end, where he asserts that
the congruence of certain business interests in the passage of the
NIRA with the interests of those committed to the purchasing power
thesis created a "historical linkage" whose "interpretive significance
... cannot be overemphasized" (p. 94). Vittoz argues that this linkage
led to the speedy passage of the NIRA because it satisfied two often
contradictory policy objectives - business revival and improvement
of working conditions. This, however, is only partially satisfying;
although the reader can infer the relevance of part 1 of the book to this
assertion, it is not elucidated clearly, and Vittoz does not document
what role the three industries he analyzed earlier had in this "historical linkage."
In the rest of part 2, Vittoz confusingly returns to a discussion of
the three industries. In chapter 5, he chronicles the experience of the
garment trades and bituminous coal industries under their respective
NRA-approved Codes. The experience for both was largely the same:
the Codes failed to bring about complete economic rationalization be4. According to this theory, one of the best ways to recover from the Depression was to
provide as much disposable income to individuals as possible. The theory is based on the idea
that products cannot be sold to people who cannot afford them.
5. Many historians have noted these same forces at work, especially the purchasing power
thesis. See, e.g., Letter of Leon H. Keyserling, in THE MAKING OF THE NEW DEAL 196 (1983);
Kidd, Collectivist Intellectuals and the Ideal of National Economic Planning, 1929-33, in NOTH·
ING ELSE TO FEAR: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICA IN THE THIRTIES 15-33 (1985).
6. Vittoz writes that
[in] older, generally less heavily capitalized industries ... labor costs typically constituted an
essential factor in the competitive equation, in which case trade unions, industrywide collective bargaining, and thus the labor provisions of the [National Recovery Act] codes as well
not infrequently were looked upon by management as perhaps the only available means by
which at least a modicum of order might eventually be restored to a depressed and chaotic
product market.
P. 94. Presumably he would include the three industries analyzed in part 1 in this description.
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cause the unions were not strong enough to ensure total compliance.
In the garment trades, the unions were unable to organize effectively
in rural areas, so that "sweatshop" competitors still proliferated. In
bituminous coal, the failure came about not because of any weaknesses
inherent in the United Mine Workers, but because of the inability of
any union to solve the industry's basic problems generated by excess
capacity and substitute goods. Thus, the competitive factors facing
the coal industry overwhelmed the efforts of the union.
The experience of the cotton textiles industry under its Code was
markedly different, as Chapter 6 demonstrates. The cotton textile
workers' union was completely unable to muster enough support to
overcome exterior market pressures. Market forces led employers to
use "wholly unrestrained" tactics against organizational efforts, which
in turn led to wildcat strikes and picket violence. The final blow for
the union (and, according to Vittoz, for the viability of the Cotton
Textile Code) was a particularly bitter general strike in 1934 which
was broken by management (p. 127).
·
In part 3 of the book, the focus again shifts completely away from
the three industries and onto the Wagner Act and later developments.
The reader gets the impression that somehow this is another book
tacked onto the first one; that Vittoz felt compelled to discuss these
issues, and added them to the end of his book. While the placement of
this part makes sense chronologically, the issues dealt with in it certainly fail to illuminate Vittoz's argument. This part of the book may
be within the penumbra of the book's broad title, but it is irrelevant to
the thesis Vittoz purports to explore.
Chapter 7 discusses the passage of the Wagner Act. While Vittoz's
portrayal is interesting, one wonders how this chapter supports his
thesis. It seems to have been included to rebut the contention that the
business opposition to the Wagner Act is proof positive of the progressive/pluralist theory. Vittoz feels that
it is one thing to acknowledge [that the Wagner Act led to greater institutional security for labor unions] and quite another to conclude that
Senator Wagner's remarkable legislative achievement in 1935 must
therefore have come about at least in part at the hands of a few unusually broad-minded industrial and corporate leaders with the capacity to
shape political events miraculously to their liking. [p. 152]

This is probably a telling point, but the reader wonders why it is made
in this book.
The final narrative chapter of the book, chapter 8, discusses the
Congress of Industrial Organization's (CIO) successes at General Motors and U.S. Steel in 1937. Vittoz argues that each company was
forced to concede to the union's demands because of its improving
competitive position; neither of the companies could afford to lose the
profits they were to make in the absence of a strike. This chapter, like
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chapter 7, provides an interesting account of its subject, but seems to
have little relation to the central thesis of the book.
The concluding chapter traces union efforts beyond World War II,
and attempts to define the lessons to be learned from this book. The
reader senses a great deal of wistfulness in the conclusion when Vittoz
writes that
[a]n elaborate explanation of the absence of a strong anticapitalist labor
movement in twentieth-century America is beyond the scope of the present study. Any such effort would require a detailed analysis of the impact of a number of highly complex political, social, and economic
circumstances more or less peculiar to the American historical experience. [p. 168]

While this certainly was beyond the scope of this book, Vittoz
should not be faulted for limiting his intended focus; rather, he should
be chastised for failing to control its boundaries. New Deal Labor Policy starts with one thesis, but moves away from it into unfocused
analysis.
This is not to say that the book is without value. Professor Vittoz
certainly does provide some evidence to support his thesis, although it
is doubtful that he has completely disproven the revisionist interpretation. 7 In addition, the book provides a fascinating analysis of the competitive forces which molded political goals in many industries. It is
refreshing to find liberal authors who do not view all business entities
homogeneously; the image of fat cat industrialists who run their companies through subjugation of the work force and complete disregard
for community or environment quickly becomes stale. Unfortunately,
Vittoz applies his mature outlook to too many diverse situations, thus
treating none of them with compelling force.

- Patrick T. Connors
7. The beauty of any "hidden conspiracy" theory is that the lack of evidence cannot disprove
it; indeed, to the zealot, such a result would simply demonstrate the power and sqope of the;
conspiracy. See J. Foot, No Bugles, No Horns: The Political Logic of Secrecy and Surprise 79
(1984) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Michigan Law Review) ("a conspiracy theory is
self-reinforcing in that a lack of evidence can be turned into affirmation, if pursued with skillful
advocation, in an undiscerning audience"); see also Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American
Politics, in THE FEAR OF CONSPIRACY 2, 7-8 (1971).

